| Transaction fee mechanism design in a post-mev world M Bahrani, P Garimidi, T Roughgarden Cryptology ePrint Archive, 2024 | 23* | 2024 |
| Deterministic Budget-Feasible Clock Auctions∗ E Balkanski, P Garimidi, V Gkatzelis, D Schoepflin, X Tan Proceedings of the 2022 Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms …, 2022 | 19 | 2022 |
| PROPm allocations of indivisible goods to multiple agents A Baklanov, P Garimidi, V Gkatzelis, D Schoepflin arXiv preprint arXiv:2105.11348, 2021 | 15 | 2021 |
| Achieving proportionality up to the maximin item with indivisible goods A Baklanov, P Garimidi, V Gkatzelis, D Schoepflin Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 35 (6), 5143-5150, 2021 | 15 | 2021 |
| Centralization in block building and proposer-builder separation M Bahrani, P Garimidi, T Roughgarden arXiv preprint arXiv:2401.12120, 2024 | 11 | 2024 |
| A framework for single-item nft auction mechanism design J Milionis, D Hirsch, A Arditi, P Garimidi Proceedings of the 2022 ACM CCS Workshop on Decentralized Finance and …, 2022 | 11* | 2022 |
| When bidders are DAOs M Bahrani, P Garimidi, T Roughgarden arXiv preprint arXiv:2306.17099, 2023 | 4 | 2023 |
| 5th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2023) D Movsowitz Davidow, Y Manevich, E Toch, A Yaish, A Zohar, H Zhang, ... Schloss Dagstuhl-Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik GmbH, 2023 | | 2023 |
